The results of the elections can be found in the end of this document. The first section on the reasons for the outbreak of the war is an adaptation of my IB Historical Investigation, but sections that are not of interest to the readers of this website are omitted. If you are interested in the entire document, including the bibliography and appendixes, contact me.

The Troika was sent to supervise the peace processes and the elections. The countries represented, however, tended to have sympathies for various sides in the conflict and their work may have been distorted by this. For example, in 1992 the US provided UNITA with USD 30 million in covert funding. When Angolan President Dos Santos visited Washington later that year, he rightly noted that “we may be confronted by two conflicting faces.” The US continued its contact with the government and its support of UNITA: Dos Santos announced the September 1992 elections on his Washington-trip, under strong pressure from the US. One month later, Savimbi visited Washington where US support for UNITA was reconfirmed.

In the process leading up to the elections, South Africa, former supporters of UNITA, was helpful with, among other, aircrafts to ease the registration of voters. This was, although initially welcome, to be disliked by the MPLA government and all South African personnel had left Angola by mid-August. The wish of South African departure came as a military supply-ship was sent to Luanda to serve as a camp for personnel, a move not accepted by the government. In addition, South African forces in support of UNITA had less than half a decade ago held major parts of Angola, causing distrust.

Earlier in 1992, Puna and Fernandes, breakaway UNITA senior officials, had warned the world that UNITA had 20,000 guerrilla soldiers and would continue the war if Savimbi lost the election and on 3^rd October, Jonas Savimbi close to confirmed this on national radio. As UN officials tried to get in contact with Savimbi, it was soon understood that he had isolated himself. He had left Luanda in favor of the bush – probably planning a war. Only a week after the announcement, UNITA generals withdrew from the FAA.

The military demobilization of troops lagged, particularly as the election day drew closer. By early September, only 41% of government troops and 24% of UNITA soldiers were demobilized. In addition, UNITA still held parts of Angolan territory and government institutions had not been set up as assumed by the peace accord.

Puna and Fernandes also informed about human right abuses within UNITA, including witch-hunts and other traditional African practices. This, in addition to Savimbi’s declaration that his people must not be humiliated with the loss of an election, may indicate that Savimbi had an overdeveloped longing to rule Angola. Also Margaret Anstee noted that, although Savimbi appeared well-reasoned and charismatic, it could not “mask the strength of Savimbi’s personality, his will of iron and more than hint of ruthlessness.”

Savimbi’s returning the country to a state of war came without loss of the presidential elections: According to Angolan legislation, the winner of presidential election has to receive 50% or more of the votes, dos Santos received 49.56%. The second rounds were never held because on 17^th October, only three weeks after the polls, fighting broke out in Huambo and later spread to Luanda. In the war that was to come, Savimbi’s UNITA was supported, though unofficially, by South Africa, and this was confirmed in 1994 when an old DC-3 was forced to land in Luanda and South African professional soldiers were sent to Angola in support of UNITA. Much of this may have been settled the last few weeks before the election, when Savimbi was in South Africa.

Savimbi, however, never accepted the loss and declared the elections to be fraudent. The claim was investigated and falsified by a committee consisting of government, UNITA and foreign members. Still, as the results were announced by the UN special representative, Margret Joan Anstee as generally free and fair, Savimbi did not accept them. This problematic nature of Savimbi was also demonstrated a little later when he continuously failed to see President Dos Santos – several times answering that he could not a few hours in advance.

UNITA recognized the results of the elections in November, but Savimbi himself rejected them on 28 December. US support of UNITA was also evident as US ambassador Cohen said, on 29 October that it was the government’s “seeming winner-take-all post-election attitude and confrontational posture of its police force which exacerbated tensions.” In May 1993, also the US recognized the results of the elections, the delay in support of UNITA.

UNITA still had the support of both South Africa and America. However, both South African Foreign Minister Botha and American Ambassador Cohen made it clear that their respective countries would not accept violence.

It is probable, however, that the government violated the Tripple Zero Clause, for example when trading with Brazil in 1993 and later in trades with Ukraine, Slovakia, Kazakhstan, the Czech Republic and Poland. Also UNITA acquired supplies, violating the Tripple Zero Clause, from South Africa through Namibia disguised as humanitarian assistance, and from Zaire. More disturbing, however, is the UNITA use of US satellite communication systems, and continued Russian military supplies to MPLA.

Although having been suggested by well-informed people, it is improbable that the weapons supplied to any side in the conflict or direct military support by any external force were necessary for the holding of free and fair elections. In fact, without the major weapon supplies, Angolan conflicts would probably not have escalated to what they were. The weapons supplies, in return, were the result of enormous natural resources resting in the Angolan soil and Angola’s willingness to trade this for weapons.

According to the HRW, “the [Bicesse] agreement was made possible partly by the ending of the Cold War, which facilitated U.S.-Soviet cooperation, and partly by the desire of the Soviet Union and Cuba to reduce their financial commitment to Angola.” In other words, as the Cold War was over, the superpowers would cooperate in the reparation of their former battlefield. This analysis, supported by the peaceful cooperation of Russian and US officials in the Troika, but opposed by the continuous support of US to UNITA and Russia to MPLA, would remove remaining distrust from the Cold War as a main cause for the new outbreak in October 1992. Further in support of this theory, there is only a bleak trend in the sympathies of the former Soviet states towards MPLA in this conflict, implying that contacts from the Cold War are not in use any longer.

Considering the above paragraphs, it would seem righteous to conclude that the outbreak of war can be blamed on any country or person responsible for the sale of military equipment to any side in the conflict, or even on Angola’s incredible amounts of valuable substances. These, of course, are both important to keep the conflict going, but as a spark to set it off something more radical is needed.

Another very important source of returning hostilities may simply be Savimbi himself. The 3^rd October announcement was a strong hint of his intentions of returning the country to war. A few days later, his act of disappearing and not allowing anybody to contact him would increase the tension of the situation. This later view is favored by Wright, who writes that “obviously, the most immediate question deal with whether Jonas Savimbi will demobilize the UNITA guerillas. If his previous behavior is any indication, Savimbi is neither willing nor capable of abiding by a peace settlement.” Also Anstee’s remarks about Savimbi’s “more than hint of ruthlessness” supports this view, andTvedten mentions this along with Angola being “simply not ready for democracy” and “the nature of the international support for the democratization process” as possible reasons for the outbreak. Tvedten also points out that UNITA’s failure to demobilize according to schedule may also be an indication of plans of renewed hostility at loss of the elections.

Savimbi’s stubborn personality was once again portrayed in the immediate aftermath of the elections when he dictated many procedures in Angolan politics, several times threatening with going to war. In the end, even as most of his demands were followed, except for the denial of the elections being fraudent, Angola ended in a state of war.

It is also probable that the support UNITA had from the US and, possibly after the South Africa trip, from South Africa, would have helped Savimbi declaring a war. Later, as both countries announced that they would not support UNITA in the case of war, this may very well have been only officially. Both countries are known to have supported UNITA in the aftermath of the elections.

Although Angola was the scene for much fighting in the the Cold War, this has only escalated the already existing internal conflicts in the country. After the fall of communism, foreign support of political movements within Angola is not directly dependent on the Cold War.

Firstly, the 1991 cease-fire that made these elections possible came after the end of the Cold War and saw the US and Russia working together as observers to the peace process. It is evident, however, that the sides of the conflict were given incredible amounts of weapons from the superpowers prior to this and that this was, partially, what made large-scale fighting possible. In addition, the presence of the superpowers had caused distrust between people of different political opinions, like everywhere else in the world. But in Angola, supporters of both sides lived side by side with enormous amounts of natural resources and, therefore civil war was almost inevitable.

Between April 1990 and May 1991, UNITA and the government held peace talks hosted by Portugal with observers from the United States and the Soviet Union. In May 1991 the Bicesse Accords, which temporarily ended the fighting, was signed. An important clause of this, in addition to the establishment of a multiparty political system and the plan for elections, was the Triple Zero Clause that prohibited any side from acquiring new supplies of military equipment.

After the South African aircrafts left Angola, airlifts for the elections were facilitated through donations from foreign nations, including the US. During the two days of the election, 320 flights carried 25,000 people to and from the 5800 voting-stations. As well, 620,000 metric tons of material was carried by plane to the polling stations. On these flights, three accidents occurred, all on successive Saturdays at about 3pm (12-26 September), all in Uige (former UNITA land), all with Russian M-17 helicopters and all as a result of the tail rotors hitting trees during take off.. In total, 15 men died, all in the last of the crashes. The crashes were investigated by UN personnel but disproven to be sabotage.

Only once, the Miramar Incident, was the peace of the two days of polls broken. Early on the last day of the polls, armed guards from Savimbi’s mansion entered neighboring houses and shot guards and residents of these, all under the cover of an attempt at Savimbi’s life. The incident, however, did not affect the elections but confirmed the tension in Angola at the time and, possibly, it may have provided yet another foreshadow of the return to war.

Sometime this night, large explosions near the UNAVEM camps disturbed order in the camp and awakened most of Luanda. The explosions near UNAVEM were caused by attacks by mortar bombs and soon blamed on sabotage by UNITA intended on UNAVEM. This marked the first violent hostilities after the elections.

The UNITA vice-president, Jeremias Chitunda, was killed in Luanda and revealed his personal diary. This diary became valuable in our understanding of Jonas Savimbi and his personal powers within UNITA. It mentions how Mr. Chitunda often referred to as the master, the father or mais velho (Portuguese for “the oldest one” – in traditional tribal structures, an important role).

President Candidate	Votes	%
Jose Eduardo dos Santos, MPLA	1,953,335	49.6
Jonas Malheiro Savimbi, Unita	1,579,298	40.1
Antonio Alberto Neto, PDA	85,249	2.2
Holden Roberto, FNLA	83,135	2.1
Others	239,866	6.0
Total	3,940,883	100.0

According to Angolan election-legislation, these results call for another presidential poll. In order to be accepted as a winner of the presidential elections, a candidate needs more than 50% of the votes. This second round never occurred because of renewed fighting.

Party	Votes	%	Seats in National Assembly
MPLA	2,124,126	53.74	129
UNITA	1,347,636	34.0	70
Others	480,503	12.25	21
Total Valid Votes	3,952,265	100.0	220
Spoilt and Blank votes	458,310
Total Votes	4,410,575
Registered Voters	4,828,468